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Core inflation is under attack. Empirically, experts have become 
increasingly disappointed with its actual performance. Theoretically, 
while some claim that it is a key inflation predictor others argue that, by 
construction, that cannot be one of its main properties, at least in the short 
run. Even if true, core inflation could still be useful if it provides good 
directional inflation forecasts. The evidence presented here using U.S., 
Canadian and Brazilian data shows that this does not seem to be the case. 
Directional forecasts are often no better than a coin toss, especially from 
the level model. The gap model’s forecasts are wrong, on average, at least 
20% of the time. More crucially, they are usually no better than a simple 
moving average of headline inflation. 
 
Keywords:  Core inflation, inflation, directional forecasts, supply shocks, 
relative prices, volatility. 
JEL Classification: C43, E31, E52 
                                                 
* The author would like to thank Ricardo Reis, Fabio Araujo, Francisco Figueiredo, Benjamin Tabak 
and Wagner Gaglianone, as well as seminar participants at the XV Meeting of the Central Bank 
Researchers Network of the Americas in La Paz, at Gerzensee and of a workshop at the Central Bank 
of Brazil. 
** Central Bank of Brazil. E-mail: tito.nicias@bcb.gov.br. 
3“It should be noted, however, that core inflation 
provides a useful guide to the extent that total CPI 
inflation is expected to converge to core inflation. If 
this were not expected to be the case, owing to 
anticipated persistent changes in the CPI components 
that are excluded from the core measure, total CPI 
inflation would take precedence” 
 
(Bank of Canada (2006), page 7; emphasis added) 
 
 
1 – Introduction 
 
Despite its widespread use by both market analysts and central banks, the 
reputation of core inflation has been increasingly under attack among experts. Even 
though it has some distinguished supporters [e.g. Blinder (2006), Mishkin (2007)], a 
growing number of economists have become disenchanted with its actual 
performance. For example, after being one of its leading enthusiasts Cecchetti (2006) 
reached the conclusion that policymakers “… should turn their attention to forecasts 
of headline inflation and stop focusing on core measures.” Some even claim that core 
inflation cannot be a good inflation predictor, a key property that it is supposed to 
have. For instance, Marques et al. (2003) argue that “By definition, a good predictor 
of future inflation must be able to account for the short-term movements on the price 
level, but this is exactly what we cannot or should not expect from a core inflation 
indicator, as it is just a summary measure of the long run characteristics of inflation.” 
Clinton (2006) agrees and notes, for Canada, that “… after 1995, as a predictor of 
headline inflation, the constant 2 percent [the midpoint of the inflation target] easily 
beats core inflation, which has no predictive power.”
1 
Indeed, the OECD (2005) analysed a variety of core measures in several 
countries and, in many cases, headline inflation was not even attracted to core 
inflation, a key property that the latter is supposed to have. Rich and Steindel (2005) 
found evidence for the U.S. that “… no core measure does an outstanding job 
forecasting CPI inflation.”, while Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) found evidence that 
headline inflation is a better predictor of itself than the traditional (ex-food & energy) 
core. More disturbing evidence comes from Gavin and Mandal (2002), whose 
findings suggest that food prices do contain useful information about trend inflation in 
                                                 
1 He argues that “Predictive power derives from ability to predict the non-core component. This is not a 
property that a useful measure of core inflation need have.” 
4the U.S. Moreover, they find that food prices are a better inflation predictor (for 
inflation in the next two years) than the traditional core inflation, which exclude them. 
More recently, da Silva Filho & Figueiredo (2011) did not find evidence that core 
inflation measures calculated by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) add significant 
explanatory power over near term inflation beyond that already contained in lagged 
inflation. The same scepticism can be found in Bullard (2011) for the US, who argue 
emphatically that “It is time to drop the emphasis on core inflation as a meaningful 
way to interpret the inflation process in the United States.” 
Not surprisingly, criticisms about the weight some central banks put on core 
inflation when assessing the inflationary outlook have also been growing. For 
example, Laidler and Aba (2000) criticised the supposedly complacent reaction of the 
Central Bank of Canada in face of rising headline inflation, since core inflation 
continued to be well behaved at the time. Buiter (2007) stated that “I believe the day 
is drawing closer when the Fed will recognise the folly of their focus on core inflation 
as a good measure of underlying inflation and as a good guide to headline inflation in 
the medium run. The discrepancy between reality and the Fed’s perception of reality 
is simply becoming too wide and obvious.” More recently, Trichet (2011) stated that 
“In the U.S. the Fed considers that core inflation is a good predictor for future 
headline inflation. In our case we consider that core inflation is not necessarily a good 
predictor for future headline inflation”.
2 
However, even assuming that core inflation has low explanatory power over 
future (magnitudes of) headline inflation its directional forecasts could still be useful. 
For example, if a rise in core inflation is usually followed by a rise in headline 
inflation, and that lead is sufficiently long so as to allow the central bank to take pre-
emptive action, then it could endow policymakers with valuable information, even if 
it is not much of a help for quantifying those changes. In other words, if core inflation 
provides few false warnings about the future direction of inflation and the lead is long 
enough, then it could be a useful inflation leading indicator.  
Policymakers value highly qualitative assessments when setting policies. 
Having a good idea whether inflation (or growth) will rise or not fall in the near future 
is crucial information in the policy-making process. For example, if inflation is near 
                                                 
2 At this point it should also be noted that those few central banks that have initially set inflation targets 
in terms of core inflation measures have abandoned that practice and started targeting headline inflation 
instead, such as in Australia and New Zealand. As far as I am concerned no central bank sets its target 
in terms of core inflation today. 
5its target reliable directional forecasts are essential when the central bank decide 
whether it should move interest rates. 
Despite the obvious importance of knowing how good core inflation’s 
directional forecasts are, to my best knowledge such an analysis has not been done 
yet. This is unexpected since such type of simple “forecasting mechanism” is widely 
used in practice by economic agents.
3 Indeed, as argue Diebold & Lopez (1996) 
“Direction-of-change forecasts are often used in financial and economic decision-
making.” This paper fills some of that gap by trying to answer questions such as: does 
headline inflation rise whenever it is below core inflation, and vice-versa? Or, does an 
increase in core inflation per se precede an increase in headline inflation? If yes, how 
reliable is the link? And, how long is the lead? More crucially, do changes in core 
inflation act as a useful guide for monetary policy? 
In order to test those hypotheses a large and rigorous forecasting exercise, 
which produced almost three thousand series of directional inflation forecasts, was 
carried out using U.S, Canadian and Brazilian data. The evidence shows that core 
inflation’s directional forecasts are often no better than merely tossing a coin. This is 
particularly true when one reads changes in core inflation per se as signs of future 
developments in headline inflation. On the other hand, while forecasts based on the 
core gap (i.e. core inflation minus headline inflation) have better directional accuracy, 
in most situations they are no better than those from simple moving averages (MA) of 
headline inflation. More importantly, despite the superior performance of the gap 
model, its accuracy remains low: on average, in the best cases, forecasts are wrong at 
least 20% of the time, and often in 30% to 50% of the time, a dismal performance. 
Therefore, the evidence supports Cecchetti’s (2006) and Bullard’s (2011) advices. 
The results are robust to different forecasting horizons, conditioning 
information sets, core inflation measures and countries. Also, threshold effects are 
taken into consideration but do not seem to be relevant to the results. Finally, 
combination of forecasts is also assessed but do not change the conclusions either. 
This is true even when all core inflation measures give the same prediction, an 
unexpected result. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 lays out the “forecasting 
mechanisms” behind core inflation’s directional forecasts, and analyses the implicit 
                                                 
3 This is particularly true when economic agents analyse gap variables. Section 2 provides other 
examples in this regard. 
6assumptions and main limitations underlying them. Section 3 uncovers key statistical 
evidence on the link between headline and core inflation for the U.S., Canada and 
Brazil and checks if they are in line with what one expects from core inflation’s 
directional forecasts. Section 4 carries out a large and rigorous directional forecasting 
exercise and assesses the performance of core inflation’s directional forecasts for 
those countries. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 – What to Expect from Core Inflation Directional Forecasts? 
 
In a multivariate and non-stationary world even directional forecasts often go 
astray. Nonetheless, this is a very common way by which economic agents forecast 
since it is simple and, hopefully, intuitive. For example, most economists would take 
for granted that inflation will rise if unemployment falls below its natural rate (i.e. 
negative gap) ignoring the possibility that, say, benign supply shocks could offset or 
even overturn the inflation pressures from a tight labour market, at least during some 
time. 
Directional forecasting is largely employed with core inflation also, albeit 
there is some variation in the precise way it is used. Clark (2001, page 18; emphasis 
added), for example, notes that “But this simple formulation captures the predictive 
content of core inflation indicators as they are often used. Some policymakers and 
analysts take movements in core inflation, by themselves, as signals of how inflation 
is likely to change in the future.”
4 
In theory, core inflation’s directional forecasts make more sense than other 
directional forecasts. The reason is that core inflation is supposed to get rid of all the 
inflation noise, thus controlling for the effects of short-run inflation shocks. This logic 
implies that one must look for a robust link between core and headline inflation in the 
medium-run but not in the short-run, when inflation is heavily under the influence of 
several idiosyncratic shocks. In the longer term, due to temporal aggregation, the 
effects of temporary shocks are smoothed or even cancelled out. Thus, this reasoning 
implies that the directional accuracy of a particular core inflation measure can provide 
essential clues on how well designed it is. For example, if a given core inflation 
                                                 
4 The simple formulation he refers to is the following: ￿￿￿  ￿   	￿  ￿
  ￿￿￿, where ￿ 
and  	￿ are headline and core inflation, respectively. This equation is known in the literature as Cogley’s 
equation. 
7measure successfully strips out the most volatile – and non-persistent – price changes 
then one should expect that it anticipates changes in medium-term inflation (i.e. 
changes in trend inflation). 
Hence, even if one agrees with Marques et al. (2003) and Clinton (2006) on 
the (short-run) forecasting limitations of core inflation, it could still have relevant 
explanatory power over medium-long term inflation, which, in fact, is the most 
relevant horizon for monetary policy. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the 
evidence shows that core inflation does not seem helpful as an inflation predictor even 
at longer horizons. Yet, as argued above, it might well be the case that core inflation’s 
directional forecasts can still be useful to policymakers. For example, assume that 
inflation is closer to the lower or upper limit of a given inflation target tolerance 
interval. In this case having reliable information about the likely direction of inflation 
could be very valuable if the target is to be met. 
The core inflation literature lists several desirable features and properties that a 
good measure of core inflation should have [see, for example, Silver (2007) and 
Wynne (1999)]. Overall, the literature allows one to make some simple directional 
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   are headline 
and core inflation during period k and l, respectively, for  , ,    1,2,…, where k 
refers to the forecasting horizon, l refers to the conditioning period and i to the point 
in time where the forecast is made.
5    and   
  are, respectively, headline and core 
inflation monthly price levels. 
                                                 
5 For example, ￿
￿ is quarterly headline inflation measured at period t, while  	￿￿￿
￿  is semi-annual core 
inflation measured at period t+3. 
8The first statement simply says that whenever core inflation rises (falls) an 
increase (decrease) in headline inflation should ensue, since core inflation captures the 
“true” trend of inflation and trends are, to a lesser or greater degree, persistent. On the 
other hand, according to statement three, the opposite is not true, that is, increases 
(decreases) in headline inflation do not signal future increases (decreases) in core 
inflation. The second statement is more restrictive: inflation will rise (fall) only if core 
inflation lies above (below) headline inflation. In this case a rise in core inflation will 
not necessarily imply an increase in headline inflation. Finally, statement four says 
that discrepancies between core and headline inflation are uninformative about future 
core inflation, since it must be temporary and, therefore, unlikely to affect the trend. 
The idea behind conditions two and four is that core inflation should act as an 
attractor to headline inflation, but not the reverse. 
As argued above, and also noted by Clark (2001), such inflation forecasting 
mechanisms, albeit simplistic, are widely used by economists. Two obvious related 
questions at this point are: What are the shortcomings of such types of mechanisms? 
How reliable forecasts from such mechanisms are in practice? Appendix 1 shows the 
implicit assumptions (and limitations) behind equations (1) to (4). 
 
3 – Preliminary Statistical Evidence 
 
What kind of statistical patterns one should or could expect from directional 
predictions such as above? The claim that core inflation is a lousy headline inflation 
predictor in the short run but a good one in the medium run suggests a hump-shaped 
cross-correlation function (CCF). In the same way, the claim that core inflation should 
not respond to lagged inflation would imply no significant cross-correlation between 
core inflation and lags of inflation. The same reasoning applies to conditions (2) and 
(4) above, except that one should look now at the relation between inflation (core 
inflation) and the core gap (i.e. core inflation minus headline inflation). 
In order to check if this is really the case evidence from three different 
countries is assessed. The first is the U.S., where core inflation is closed watched by 
both the Fed and the market. The second is Canada where it acts as the operational 
target for monetary policy, attesting its utmost importance. The third one is Brazil, 
which sharply differs from the other two countries by its history of high and volatile 
9inflation. The period analysed for the U.S. and Canada goes from 1995.1 to 2008.12, 
while for Brazil it begins in 1996.1 and ends in 2008.12.
6 
Since in addition to the CPI (CPIUS) the PCE (PCEUS) also plays a central 
role in Fed’s monetary policy their cores will be analysed. More precisely, the ex-food 
and energy (CPIUS-EX) and the median (CPIUS-MED) cores are evaluated for the 
CPI, while the ex-food and energy core (PCEUS-EX) is assessed for the PCE. As to 
the Canadian CPI (CPICAN), the core that excludes its eight most volatile items as 
well as the effect of changes in indirect taxes (CPICAN-EX) – used as the operational 
target for the Canadian inflation targeting regime (see Macklem, 2001) – is analysed. 
Finally, for Brazil six cores are analysed: the first three measures originally calculated 
by the BCB, named here EXCORE (exclusion core), TMCORE (trimmed mean core), 
and STMCORE (smoothed trimmed mean core), and three other measures calculated 
by da Silva Filho and Figueiredo (2011), named IPCAEX1, IPCAEX2 and 
IPCADW.
7,8 
Figure 1 in Appendix 3 plots the cross-correlations between the PCEUS and 
the PCEUS-EX for the U.S, between the CPICAN and CPICAN-EX for Canada, and 
between the IPCA and both the STMCORE the IPCAEX2 for Brazil.
9 As can be seen, 
none of the four CCFs are hump-shaped. On the contrary, the correlation between 
inflation and lagged core inflation is initially high and dies out very quickly, with the 
exception of the STMCORE, which has longer memory.
10 
However, one marked difference between the U.S. and Canada on the one 
hand and Brazil on the other hand is the degree of “inflation persistence”. While in 
Brazil inflation is significantly cross-correlated with lagged core inflation up to 
around the fourth or fifth lag (the STMCORE is more persistent), in the U.S. and 
                                                 
6  Although the sample refers to the post-stabilisation period in Brazil, in which inflation was much 
lower than historical levels, it remained well above rates found in industrial countries. Indeed, while the 
annual average inflation rate in Brazil was 6.7% during that period, it was 2.4% in the U.S. (CPI) and 
2.0% in Canada. 
7 IPCAEX1 and IPCAEX2 are two others exclusion cores built upon sounder statistical and economic 
foundations. The IPCADW is a double weighted core. For details about their construction as well as 
about the first three cores see da Silva Filho and Figueiredo (2011). The acronym IPCA comes from the 
broad consumer price index, which is the official inflation targeting index in Brazil. 
8 As of 2010 the Central Bank of Brazil has stopped calculating the EXCORE and the TMCORE, and 
replaced them by the IPCAEX2 and the IPCADW, which have begun to be officially calculated. 
9 For the US, the evidence is similar for the CPIUS-EX and CPIUS-MED. For Brazil, the evidence for 
the EXCORE, TMCORE, IPCAEX1 and IPCADW is similar to that from the IPCAEX2. Therefore, 
those cases are not presented here. 
10 The longer memory of the STMCORE is due, to a large extent, to the fact that infrequent and 
relatively large price changes are smoothed along the current and next eleven months. For further 
details on that measure see Figueiredo (2001).  
10Canada correlations longer than the first lag are insignificant (apart from some 
disperse – and difficult to interpret – significant lags elsewhere).
11 Moreover, in the 
latter cases they alternate in sign (although the bulk of the negative correlations are 
insignificant). Those differences suggest very different statistical properties for 
inflation (and, therefore, core inflation) in Brazil compared to the U.S. and Canada. 
This could be, for example, due to inflation behaving more like a MA process 
(or a higher-order autoregressive process, which could produce oscillatory dynamics) 
in the U.S. and Canada, while in Brazil it seems to be a low order (i.e. short memory) 
highly auto-correlated (i.e. persistent) process.
12 
Finally, note that in Brazil the correlation between core inflation and lagged 
inflation is significant, albeit being weaker and becoming insignificant earlier than in 
the opposite direction. This feature seems to conflict with the view that headline 
inflation should convey little information about core inflation, since in the short run 
its signal to noise ratio is low. 
Thus, the evidence so far suggests that one should be sceptical about using the 
level model to make directional statements about future headline inflation. Moreover, 
if there is any predictive content, it seems to be in the very short-run. So, what about 
the gap model? Is it more in accordance with what the theory predicts?  
Figure 2 shows the results of the same exercise carried out above, but now 
replacing the core inflation by the core gap. The evidence is similar to that of Figure 1 
in the sense that in all three countries the core gap seems to be not very informative 
about future headline inflation. The evidence is particularly poor for the PCEUS-EX – 
the most important U.S. core –, since no useful information is apparently stemming 
from it.
13 Moreover, in the cases of the CPICAN-EX, STMCORE and IPCAEX2 if 
there is any predictive content it seems to be small and for the short-run only, exactly 
the same evidence found before. In fact, the size of the significant cross-correlations is 
very small and the temporal precedence is usually no longer than 6 or 7 months.
14 
                                                 
11 The significant cross-correlation at lag 12 suggests some seasonality left in the core measures, which, 
by the very concept of core inflation, is not supposed to exist. This problem is more intense in the 
CPIUS-EX (not shown). 
12 Thus, the evidence suggests that inflation remains highly persistent in Brazil, more than ten years 
after the stabilisation of the economy. 
13 The evidence for the EXCORE and TMCORE is similar from the PCEUS, except from the fact that 
first two correlations are significant.  
14 The same evidence was found for both the CPIUS-EX and the CPIUS-MED. 
11Note that in the latter cases the CCFs do show a hump-shaped pattern now. 
However, the first two cross-correlations are significantly negative, which is an 
apparently unexpected result since it implies that, in the very short run, whenever the 
core gap is positive inflation is expected to fall, being repelled rather than attracted 
towards core inflation.
15 Subsequently, normally from the fourth to the seventh lag, 
the cross-correlations turn out to be significantly positive. Appendix 2 goes deeper 
into the reasons between that negative sign as well as the significant cross correlation 
between Brazilian core inflation and lagged headline inflation.  
In a nutshell, the evidence so far suggests that directional forecasts based on 
the core inflation level are likely to produce poor results. There apparently remains 
some possibility that forecasts based on the core gap could be useful to monetary 
policy. However, both the small size of the significant correlations (especially for the 
U.S. and Canada) and the tight temporal precedence (around six months) are unlikely 
to allow those forecasts to be used effectively in a pre-emptively manner.  
 
4 – Directional Forecasting Using Core Inflation 
 
This section carries out a large directional inflation forecasting simulation 
exercise in order to assess how well core inflation anticipates the direction of change 
of inflation according to both the level and gap models (equations 1 and 2, 
respectively). The results provide non parametric estimates of the probability of 
forecasting success for each measure of core inflation, for each model. 
The simulation produces pseudo out-of-sample forecasts, since no future 
information is used when forecasts are made.
16 Thus, the results should provide a 
fairly reliable assessment of the real directional forecasting capabilities of core 
inflation using such types of simple, but widely used, forecasting mechanisms.  
Preliminary evidence from Section 3 suggests that forecast accuracy is likely 
to be poor. However, note that there are many variations in the precise way equations 
(1) and (2) could be used. Not only one could focus at different forecasting horizons 
(i.e. different k) – and forecast accuracy is likely to vary with them – but the 
conditioning period could vary as well [i.e. both the core change and the core gap 
                                                 
15 One hypothesis that could help explaining this dynamics is that, at higher frequencies, core inflation 
is also picking up transitory inflation movements, hindering the expected one-way convergence. 
16 Moreover, inflation is an indicator that is rarely revised, meaning that one does not have to deal with 
vintage data issues here, improving the reliability of inference. 
12could be calculated for different conditioning periods (different l)]. Hence there are a 
large number of possible combinations, and any meaningful result has to take them 
into account.  
Hence, for each measure of core inflation four forecast horizons are focused: 
headline inflation over the next 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters (i.e. k = 3, 6, 9 and 12).
17 Also, 
four conditioning periods are used: the latest 1, 2, 3 and 4 (i.e. l  = 3, 6, 9 and 
12) quarters.
18 Moreover, in order to avoid the overlapping forecast problem only non-
overlapping forecasts are analysed.
19 Finally, the performance of mechanisms (1) and 
(2) is confronted against that of a simple moving average (MA). More precisely, core 
inflation (   





different MAs are computed: 12, 18 and 24 months.
21 Overall the simulation 
generated almost three thousand series of forecasts. 
The goal of the simulation is twofold: first, to provide an accurate idea of how 
reliable directional forecasts from models (1) and (2) are. In other words, how 
frequently are they wrong? second, to get an approximate idea of how they fare 
against a simple benchmark “model” (i.e. the MA). Hence no mean equality test is 
carried out in order to check if performances are statistically different from either a 
MA or a coin toss. If, for example, the core inflation’s performance is close to that of 
a “MA core” that evidence is already meaningful. It would indicate, for example, that 
the large amount of time and effort spent by both central banks and market analysts in 
building and analysing core inflation is probably unnecessary an unproductive. 
The exercise begins by assessing first the country with the lowest signal-to-
noise ratio: Brazil, where forecast accuracy is expected to be lower. Figure 3A shows 
the directional performance of the level model in that case. As can be seen, in almost 
all situations directional forecasts are worse than a simple coin toss. Moreover, with 
the exception of the 2-quarter ahead horizon, simple MAs of headline inflation beat 
                                                 
17 For Brazil the focus is on the 1996.1–2008.12 period, while for the U.S. and Canada the assessed 
period is 1995.1–2008.12. 
18 Hence, each measure of core inflation produces 32 series of forecasts, half for each model, for each 
type of simulation. 
19 That is, in simulations  . Therefore, four datasets are constructed from monthly data – as 
explained in Section 2 – one for each frequency. 
20 Therefore, the MA is calculated using only information available at the time of the forecast. 
21 After calculating the monthly pro rata value of the MA that figure is raised to 3 to build the inflation 
forecast for the next quarter, to six for the next six months forecast, and so on. Note that the gap is zero 
by construction when the one-year ahead inflation is being forecast using the last four quarters as the 
conditioning period. Hence in this case no forecast is made. 
13core inflation. Those results suggest the complete uselessness of such type of 
forecasting mechanism for Brazil. 
Figure 3B shows that the gap model fares much better than the level model, as 
one would expect. Yet, note that in many cases – mostly in the 3 and 4-quarter ahead 
horizons – its accuracy is only slightly better than a coin toss. More importantly, the 
4-quarter ahead forecasts – which policymakers have greater interest on – are worse 
than a simple coin toss forecast in practically all cases. Furthermore, even those 
models that perform better than a random guess produce forecasts whose accuracy is 
similar to those of simple MA model of inflation. More crucially, even in the best 
cases (e.g. STMCORE, two-quarter ahead horizon), forecasts are usually wrong 
around 30% of the time. Typically, forecasts go astray, on average, in about 35% to 
50% of the time, a poor performance. Finally, note that forecast accuracy has a hump-
shaped pattern, peaking at the 2-quarter ahead horizon. This is bad news for monetary 
policy, given that even if forecast accuracy had been commendable monetary policy 
needs a longer lead to work effectively. 
How the evidence above compares to that from the U.S. and Canada? Since 
inflation has been both lower and more stable in those countries one would expect a 
better outcome given the higher expected signal-to-noise ratio. Figures 5A and 5B 
show the results for the U.S. For both the CPI and the PCE the evidence from the 
level model remains the same: it is worse than a simple coin toss in almost all cases. 
Although better, the results for the gap model are similar to those found for 
Brazil, especially in the CPI case: the directional performance has a hump-shaped 
pattern peaking at the 2-quarter ahead horizon, there is a marked deterioration of 
forecast accuracy at longer horizons and the accuracy rate is usually no better than a 
simple MA model of inflation. On average, forecasts are wrong in about 25% to 50% 
of the time, a lousy performance. 
Forecast accuracy is equally poor for the PCE core – the most closely watched 
core measure in the U.S. However, in this case there are two noteworthy differences. 
First, the increasing forecast accuracy at longer horizons.
22 Indeed, the one-year ahead 
forecasts emerge as being more accurate than shorter term forecasts. At least from this 
point of view, the evidence suggests that the Fed’s decision to put more weight on the 
PCE core rather than on the CPI core is correct. Second, the PCE core easily beats the 
                                                 
22 This holds for the PCE core, but not for the MAs. 
14benchmark models in the 4-quarter ahead horizon. That is, it apparently adds relevant 
information over simple MAs at longer forecast horizons. 
Finally, the evidence for Canada – where the core CPI plays a major role in 
monetary policy, being the operational target – remains unchanged, as Figure 7 
shows. The level model produced the worst performance among all three countries. 
As to the gap model, note that apart from the 3-quarter ahead case the accuracy of the 
CPI core’s forecasts is either similar or worse than simple MA models. In this regard 
is worthwhile to call to attention the good performance of the MA12 model for the 2-
quarter ahead forecasts, when average forecast is above 90%. Note also that, as in the 
U.S. PCE case, the forecast accuracy of the Canadian CPI core is higher at longer 
horizons and, as in the U.S CPI and Brazilian cases, the MA models’ accuracy has a 
hump-shaped pattern, peaking at the 2-quarter ahead horizon. Finally, although the 
average accuracy is better in Canada compared to the U.S. and Brazil, it remains well 
below what one needs for the core to become a reliable predictor of the direction of 
change of inflation. 
One hypothesis for such a poor performance witnessed so far – especially in 
the case of the U.S. and Canada – could be due to the existence of some kind of 
threshold effect. For example, in the gap model it might well be the case that 
predictions are more accurate once one allows for a minimum gap size. In the same 
way, in the level model higher accuracy could follow once we allow for a minimum 
size in core inflation’s change. This is a sensible hypothesis since small differences 
could be mainly reflecting noise rather than signal. 
Hence, the hypothesis that core inflation’s directional forecast accuracy have 
been hindered by the existence of some kind of threshold effect is tested. Note that 
this possibility implies a “range of inaction” whenever the size of the core change or 
the core gap fall within the | | p.p. interval, where δ is the chosen threshold value. 
Likewise, inflation is considered to have remained constant if the magnitude of its 
change falls within that same interval. 
For each frequency, the size of the (maximum) threshold was determined to 
reflect the interval encompassed by 25% of the observations around the mean of the 
15distribution of changes in inflation during the sample, assuming that they are normally 
distributed.
23,24 
The results are shown in the same Tables 3, 5 and 7 for Brazil, U.S. and 
Canada, respectively, in the following way: the entries that are outlined by a thin line 
indicate those cases in which allowing for threshold effects led to higher accuracy. 
The entries that are outlined by a thick line indicate, conditional on greater accuracy, 
an accuracy rate greater than 50% for the level model, and 60% for the gap model. As 
can be seen threshold effects do not seem to be relevant, especially for the gap model. 
And, in those cases where forecast accuracy is improved, the improvement is not 
large. Therefore, not taking threshold effects into account does not explain the failure 
of (1) and (2). 
As a final attempt to improve directional forecast accuracy, the performance of 
combination of forecasts is also assessed.
25 In the U.S. CPI case, for example, when 
two cores are analysed (median and exclusion), predictions that inflation will rise, fall 
or remain constant only take place if both measures point to the same direction (i.e. if 
there is unanimity). When individual predictions are in conflict the result is read as 
inconclusive and, therefore, inflation is assumed to remain constant. 
In the Brazilian case – where more than two cores are analysed – two groups 
of three cores are assessed: the three measures that were originally calculated by the 
Central Bank of Brazil (called here the old cores) and the three calculated by da Silva 
Filho and Figueiredo (2011) (called the new cores). Note that in this case forecasts 
could be combined in more than one way, so that four criteria were chosen. In the first 
criterion, a simple “majority” rule is applied. That is, predictions that inflation will 
change (i.e. rise or fall) require that at least two cores’ forecasts are in agreement, 
otherwise a “random walk” prediction (i.e. no change) is assumed.
26 
                                                 
23 The interval is defined as the difference between (the corresponding values of) the 62.5th-percentile 
and the 37.5th-percentile of the distribution of changes in the inflation rate. Since the distribution is 
assumed to be normal, that distance can be directly calculated as 2 Φ
−1(0.625) ≈ 0.64σ, where Φ
−1(.) 
refers to the inverse of a standard normal cdf (cumulative distribution function). 
24 This criterion implied (maximum) thresholds values for the 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarter ahead forecasts 
equal to, respectively, 0.3, 0.6, 1.0 and 0.9 p.p. for Brazil; 0.3, 0.6, 0.7 and 0.2 p.p. for the U.S. CPI; 
0.2, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.3 p.p. for the U.S PCE; and 0.3, 0.5, 0.5 and 0.4 p.p. for Canada. Calculated values 
were rounded to the nearest decimal. Threshold effects were tested beginning in 0.1 p.p. and increased 
by 0.1 p.p. until the above limits were reached. 
25 Given that only one core is analysed for both the U.S. PCE and the Canadian CPI it is not possible to 
combine core’s forecasts in those cases, except for the MAs models. 
26 That is, inflation is also expected to remain constant if one core points to an increase in inflation, the 
other to a decrease and the last one to stability. 
16An interesting possibility that arises when more than two forecasts are 
involved is the emergence of different “classes” of directional predictions (e.g. weak, 
strong and very strong forecasts). For example, it seems natural to claim that the 
signal stemming from a situation when two out of three cores indicate that inflation 
will rise is weaker than the signal produced when all three measures are in agreement. 
Therefore, besides the intuitive majority criterion above, three other types of forecasts 
combination based on the strength of the directional signal are also assessed. Strength 
is calculated as follows 
 
                  
  
 
   
 
 
Where    stands for the strength of the signal,   
  denotes either ∆     
   (i.e. the change 
in core inflation) or       
         (i.e. the core gap),           
 1,      
   0, | |   
   1,      
 , where 
δ is the chosen threshold value, and i indexes the core inflation measure. That is, for 
each type of directional outcome a different value is assigned according to whether 
inflation is expected to fall (-1), remains constant (0) or rise (1). 
Hence, in the first case (i.e. the second criterion), inflation is expected to fall, 
remain constant or rise whenever     0 ,      0  or     0 , respectively. In the 
second case (i.e. the third criterion), forecasts that inflation will change (i.e. rise or 
fall) only take place when the signal is strong enough, |  |   ⅔, otherwise inflation is 
expected to remain constant.
27 In the third case (i.e. the fourth criterion), unanimity is 
required for a forecast to be made. That is, if the signal is not overwhelmingly 
convincing no forecast is made, which means that forecasts are carried out only in 
certain situations.
28 This exercise tries to gauge if directional performance increases 
once forecasts are made only in (supposedly) less uncertain scenarios. Finally, the 
                                                 
27 In the current case ￿ could take the following values: – 1, -⅔, -⅓, 0, ⅓, ⅔ or 1. 
28 Note, therefore, that this criterion is slightly different from the unanimity criterion used for the US 
CPI, when only two forecasts are combined. In that case, when the cores are in disagreement a no 
change prediction is made. 
17benchmark models’ (i.e. the MAs) forecasts are also combined and their precision are 
assessed, for all price indices.
29 
The results are shown in Tables 4, 6 and 8 for Brazil, U.S. and Canada, 
respectively. The column named “Major” stands for the majority criterion, “Signal 1” 
and “Signal 2” stand for the first two signal strength criteria, respectively, while 
“Unam” refers to the unanimity criterion as just explained.
30 The evidence is uniform 
among all three countries. 
Concerning the level model, first and most importantly, forecast accuracy 
remains poor. Indeed, interestingly, in all cases but the four-quarter ahead forecasts 
for the Canadian CPI, the combination of directional (qualitative) level forecasts were 
unable to produce more accurate forecasts than before, in sharp contrast to what 
usually happens when quantitative forecasts are combined. Perhaps even more 
striking, the precision of the unanimity criterion – when uncertainty is supposedly 
smaller ex-ante – is lower than before, showing that it is nothing but an illusion to 
assume that forecasts are more reliable when all cores point to the same direction. 
Indeed, in several cases precision was much lower than when other criteria were used. 
As to the gap model, although there are some differences, conclusions remain 
basically the same. Once again, first and most importantly, combination of directional 
forecasts do not increase forecast accuracy in almost all cases. Second, the unanimity 
criterion now seems to produce more accurate forecasts in many cases, even though in 
most of them the gains are small. Noteworthy exceptions are the two-quarter ahead 
forecasts for Brazil, for the new cores, when forecast accuracy is above 70%, and for 
Canada, when forecast accuracy reaches 80%. However, it should be noticed that 
when the unanimity criterion is used forecasts are not always made, which means that 
in many occasions there are no forecasts available. The percentage of times that a 
forecast is made is shown between parentheses Therefore, higher accuracy should be 
put into perspective.  
 
   
                                                 
29 Since no MA forecast is made for the one-year ahead horizon using the last four quarters as the 
conditioning period (see footnote 21), in that case only two MA forecasts (MA18 and MA24) are 
combined, and the unanimity criteria used is the same one used for the US CPI. 
30 See footnote 28. 
185 – Conclusion 
 
Many economists read recent increases in core inflation as a reliable sign that 
headline inflation will rise in the near future (level model). Others consider that the 
trigger is pulled only when core inflation is above headline inflation (gap model), 
since core inflation is thought to be an attractor of headline inflation as it (should) 
reflect the true underlying inflation trend. 
Despite the immense popularity in practice of such types of “forecasting 
mechanisms” to my best knowledge the accuracy of core inflation directional 
forecasts has not yet been investigated in the core inflation literature. This paper tries 
to fill some of that gap by analysing the directional forecast accuracy of core inflation 
in the United States, Canada and Brazil, providing non parametric estimates of the 
probability of forecasting success for the two types of models cited above.  
In order to accomplish that a large and rigorous forecasting simulation 
exercise, that ended up producing almost three thousand series of directional 
forecasts, was carried out. The overall evidence was quite uniform among countries, 
different measures of core inflation and forecasting horizons. Some of the main results 
are as follows: first, and most importantly, forecast accuracy was low throughout, 
although there were relevant differences in accuracy between the level and gap 
models, with the latter being clearly more accurate than the former. While the level 
model’s forecasts are usually no better than a simple coin toss, those from the gap 
model are usually off-track, on average, at least 20% of the time. For Brazil, where 
inflation’s signal-to-noise ratio is lower than in Canada and the U.S, accuracy is 
worse. 
Given the above disappointing results, the hypothesis that some kind of 
threshold effect could have hindered forecast accuracy was taken into consideration. 
However, even taking into account those effects accuracy remained low. Then, as a 
final attempt to increase precision, directional forecasts from different core inflation 
measures were combined in different ways. Although in some cases (for the gap 
model) forecast accuracy increased, it remained well below what is needed for one to 
claim that such models could be useful for monetary policy. Indeed, accuracy 
remained low even in those cases in which the forecasts from all types of core 
inflation pointed to the same direction. In other words: contrary to common intuition, 
unanimity does not seem to increase reliability and, therefore, accuracy. 
19Moreover, even if precision had been higher, in most cases there is a sharp 
deterioration of forecast accuracy beyond the 2-quarter ahead horizon. This is bad 
news for monetary policy since it needs a longer lead to work effectively. Another 
important result is that directional forecasts from simple – one-sided – moving 
averages “models” of headline inflation are usually at least as accurate as those from 
core inflation. 
Hence, this paper takes a sceptical view about using core inflation for 
predicting headline inflation, whether quantitatively or qualitatively (i.e. 
directionally). Consequently, it gives support to Trichet’s (2011) statement that “… 
[in the ECB] we consider that core inflation is not necessarily a good predictor for 
future headline inflation”, or the scepticism of Cecchetti’s (2006) and Bullard’s 
(2011). However, if one remains willing to use the information provided by core 
inflation, then it is both more simple and at least as (in)effective to use simple MAs of 
headline inflation. 
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In practice, several reasons can prevent equations (1) to (4) to hold. As says 
Blinder (1997; italics added) “The name of the game then was distinguishing the 
signal from the noise, which was often difficult. The key question on my mind was 
typically: What part of each monthly observation on inflation is durable and what part 
is fleeting?” Thus, if core inflation is not able to successfully disentangle temporary 
from persistent or permanent shocks, then it will be less informative about the current 
inflation trend and, as a consequence, about future inflation. 
A very common way of thinking about core inflation is to assume that 
inflation can be divided into two parts: a durable – or more persistent one – 
represented by the trend, or core inflation, and a transitory – or temporary one – 
represented by deviations around that trend, or noise. Such decomposition can be 
characterized in the following way 
 
             ,              ∑       
 
                      0,  
   (5) 
                 ,                  0 ,   
   (6) 
 
where it is usually assumed that   0  and       ,     0 . In other words, it is 
usually assumed that temporary shocks have no persistency and, hence, that the 
distinction between temporary and permanent shocks is clear-cut. However, if this is 
not the case, that is, if       ,     0  and   0 , which is likely to happen, then 
building a good measure of core inflation pose real challenges in practice.
31  
For example, a temporary, yet persistent shock, could not only make core 
inflation deviates from headline inflation for an extended period of time, hampering 
its forecasting capabilities, but if the central bank puts too much emphasis on core 
inflation it will accommodate a sizable part of those deviations adding fuel to the 
latent inflationary process. In that case the supposedly temporary shock will end up 
having some permanent effects. In other words, shocks are not exogenously 
temporary or permanent, since their nature depend, to some degree, on the very 
reaction of policymakers. Indeed, since policymakers give importance to other 
variables besides inflation or yet can misjudge the persistency of some shocks (e.g. oil 
                                                 
31 The model above assumes that inflation has a unit root. However, one could also think of it as having 
a stationary, yet very persistent trend. 
23shock), in practice temporary shocks end up being accommodated to some extent, 
becoming, in part, permanent.  
On practical grounds, a common difficulty with those core measures that 
exclude pre-determined groups of goods is that the volatility and persistence among 
groups can change markedly over time. Even when the criterion for exclusion is based 
on the cross-section item or group’s volatility, persistent price changes could still be 
systematically excluded.
32 In both cases the result is the emergence of bias during 
extended periods of time, hampering both core inflation’s forecasting capabilities and 
its usefulness to monetary policy. In a nutshell, the task of identifying temporary from 
permanent shocks to inflation is a challenging one not only due to the changing nature 
or source of shocks but also because the reaction of the central bank is ultimately an 
important determinant of such a distinction. This fact jeopardizes the idea of 
temporary and permanent shocks that underpins the core inflation theory. 
Notice that since core inflation is supposed to uncover the “true” inflation 
trend, the qualitative statements above could also be read as particular cases of a 
cointegrating system between inflation and core inflation, such as: 
 
∆  
         ∑   , ∆    
   
      ∑   , ∆      
   
               
        
       ,    (7) 
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For example, the assumption that inflation will rise whenever core inflation is 
above headline inflation requires that     0 , along with the restriction that   ,   
     ,      ,        ,   0 . The idea that the opposite does not hold requires 
that     0  as well as   ,        ,   0 . The assumption that an increase in core 
inflation per se signals future increases in headline inflation requires that ∑   ,   
 
   
0 and 0,1=⋯=0,=0=0. Thus, whenever one uses (1) to (4) to make directional 
predictions about inflation one is implicitly assuming that all the associated 
restrictions are valid, which is unlikely. In other words, one is ignoring the short-run 
dynamics. More importantly, one is also assuming that other variables’ effects on 
inflation are negligible, even in the short-run, what explains the absence of a vector of 
exogenous variables in the system above.   
                                                 
32 For an unfortunate actual example of that phenomenon see da Silva Filho and Figueiredo (2011).  
24Appendix 2 
 
Although the negative cross-correlations in the first lags of Figure 2 seems to be at 
variance with the theory, this result is to be expected, as equation (9) shows 
 
  ,        
  ￿   ￿￿￿
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  ￿
    
       
  
    
   for     0, 1,   ,       (9)    
 
where          
      . Notice that the cross-correlation at lag zero has to be 
non-positive since    ￿ 0       0  and   ￿     . Indeed, the case in which core 
inflation does not purge any temporary shocks (i.e.      ) provides an upper bound 
equal to zero for the cross-correlation at lag zero, while the case in which core 
inflation and headline inflation are orthogonal to each other provides a lower bound 
equal to           ⁄ . Moreover, since inflation is usually positively auto-correlated 
adjacent cross-correlations are likely to be negative. Subsequently, as the auto-
correlation fades away, the second term in the r.h.s. could be offset or overcome by 
the first. 
The higher the volatility of inflation relative to core inflation the more likely 
the cross-correlations are to be initially negative (and the less likely to be significantly 
positive later on). That implies that in an economy which inflation is subjected to 
large or frequent temporary shocks the core inflation gap will have low predictive 
power over headline inflation. This result provides some support to the claims of 
Marques  et al. (2003) and Clinton (2006). Equation (9) has other interesting 
implications. For example, as central banks become successful in achieving price 
stability (i.e. low and stable inflation), then the core gap is more likely to be 
informative about future inflation, since inflation persistence will become smaller. In 
other words, core inflation is likely to be most useful when inflation is less persistent 
and volatile, exactly when it is less needed. 
Moreover, the significant positive correlation between core inflation and 
lagged headline inflation, displayed in Figure 1, is to be expected in many cases as 
well. Headline inflation can be decomposed into a permanent (core) component and a 
transitory (temporary) one,        
      , which are assumed to be uncorrelated. If 
this is the case then one has that 
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That is, the contemporaneous cross-correlation is given by the relative 
volatility of core inflation, which is a positive number less than one. Moreover, since 
core inflation is supposed to be a highly persistent process, adjacent cross-correlations 
are also expected to be positive. Therefore, their size depends on two opposing forces: 
one the one hand, the more persistent a given core inflation is the higher its degree of 
auto-correlation and the greater its cross-correlation with lagged inflation. On the 
other hand, the more persistent a given core inflation is the lower its relative volatility 
and the lesser its cross-correlation with lagged inflation. Hence, unless the signal-to-
noise ratio is very low (i.e. actual inflation is frequently very apart from trend 
inflation) one should expect significant correlations between core inflation and lagged 
headline inflation in the short-run. 
Finally, both equations (9) and (10) imply that in an economy subjected to 
frequent and large price shocks (i.e. low signal-to-noise), core inflation (or the core 
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33 
Figure 3A: Brazil (1996.1–2008.12) 
 
Figure 3B: Brazil (1996.1–2008.12) 
 
                                                 
33 The entries that are outlined by a thin line indicate those cases in which, allowing for threshold 
effects, led to higher accuracy. The entries that are outlined by a thick line indicate, conditional on 
greater accuracy, an accuracy rate greater than 50% for the level model, and 60% for the gap model. 
28Figure 4A: Brazil (1996.1–2008.12) 
 
Figure 4B: Brazil (1996.1–2008.12) 
 
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
1 47% 47% 19% 35% (49%) 35% 35% 24% 38% (62%) 39% 39% 27% 36% (77%)
2 47% 47% 19% 35% (49%) 33% 33% 22% 31% (70%) 33% 33% 31% 36% (87%)
3 47% 47% 19% 35% (49%) 47% 47% 29% 39% (66%) 49% 49% 29% 41% (70%)
4 47% 47% 19% 35% (49%) 47% 47% 35% 43% (77%) 47% 47% 37% 45% (81%)
47% 47% 19% 35% (49%) 41% 41% 27% 38% (69%) 42% 42% 31% 39% (79%)
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
1 30% 30% 13% 25% (52%) 48% 48% 30% 41% (75%) 43% 43% 35% 40% (88%)
2 30% 30% 13% 25% (52%) 39% 39% 22% 36% (63%) 35% 35% 17% 24% (75%)
3 30% 30% 13% 25% (52%) 43% 43% 30% 39% (75%) 30% 30% 17% 25% (71%)
4 30% 30% 13% 25% (52%) 39% 39% 26% 33% (75%) 39% 39% 30% 35% (83%)
30% 30% 13% 25% (52%) 42% 42% 27% 37% (72%) 37% 37% 25% 31% (79%)
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 50% 50% 29% 44% (64%) 33% 33% 20% 30% (64%) 40% 40% 27% 33% (79%)
6 67% 67% 40% 55% (64%) 40% 40% 33% 42% (79%) 40% 40% 33% 42% (79%)
9 50% 50% 29% 44% (64%) 40% 40% 27% 36% (71%) 40% 40% 33% 42% (79%)
12 50% 50% 29% 44% (64%) 53% 53% 27% 44% (64%) 47% 47% 40% 43% (93%)
54% 54% 31% 47% (64%) 42% 42% 27% 38% (70%) 42% 42% 33% 40% (82%)
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 55% 55% 27% 43% (58%) 45% 45% 45% 50% (83%) 45% 45% 36% 40% (83%)
6 55% 55% 27% 43% (58%) 45% 45% 45% 50% (83%) 45% 45% 45% 45% (92%)
9 55% 55% 27% 43% (58%) 45% 45% 36% 50% (67%) 45% 45% 45% 50% (83%)
12 55% 55% 27% 43% (58%) 55% 55% 36% 44% (75%) 55% 55% 36% 44% (75%)
55% 55% 27% 43% (58%) 48% 48% 41% 49% (77%) 48% 48% 41% 45% (83%)
(1) Forecasts are made only when there is unanimity.
Unam
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Non-Overlapping Forecasts: One-Quarter Ahead 
Combination of Qualitative Forecasts: Level Model
NEW CORES OLD CORES
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
1 65% 65% 52% 68% (77%) 54% 54% 40% 68% (63%) 58% 58% 44% 62% (75%)
2 54% 54% 40% 68% (63%) 62% 62% 40% 68% (63%) 56% 56% 33% 63% (54%)
3 58% 58% 44% 62% (75%) 54% 54% 35% 61% (56%) 56% 56% 27% 58% (48%)
4 64% 64% 47% 67% (71%) 56% 56% 31% 52% (54%) 48% 48% 33% 61% (56%)
60% 60% 46% 66% (71%) 56% 56% 37% 62% (59%) 54% 54% 34% 61% (58%)
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
1 67% 67% 54% 65% (83%) 63% 63% 38% 60% (60%) 71% 71% 50% 71% (52%)
2 71% 71% 50% 71% (71%) 71% 71% 50% 80% (60%) 63% 63% 42% 77% (52%)
3 63% 63% 46% 73% (63%) 54% 54% 38% 69% (52%) 67% 67% 29% 78% (36%)
4 63% 63% 33% 67% (50%) 63% 63% 29% 58% (52%) 58% 58% 42% 67% (60%)
66% 66% 46% 69% (67%) 63% 63% 39% 67% (56%) 65% 65% 41% 73% (50%)
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 53% 53% 40% 55% (73%) 50% 50% 38% 75% (53%) 56% 56% 38% 67% (60%)
6 67% 67% 40% 55% (73%) 69% 69% 44% 78% (60%) 50% 50% 19% 50% (40%)
9 60% 60% 47% 64% (73%) 44% 44% 31% 63% (47%) 44% 44% 25% 50% (53%)
12 53% 53% 33% 56% (60%) 50% 50% 25% 43% (47%) 56% 56% 25% 50% (53%)
58% 58% 40% 57% (70%) 53% 53% 34% 65% (52%) 52% 52% 27% 54% (52%)
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 50% 50% 42% 45% (92%) 42% 42% 42% 56% (69%) 50% 50% 33% 50% (62%)
6 42% 42% 25% 30% (77%) 50% 50% 33% 50% (62%) 42% 42% 25% 50% (46%)
9 42% 42% 25% 38% (62%) 42% 42% 25% 43% (54%) 42% 42% 17% 50% (31%)
12 50% 50% 25% 43% (54%) 58% 58% 17% 40% (38%) 33% 33% 17% 29% (54%)
46% 46% 29% 39% (71%) 48% 48% 29% 47% (56%) 42% 42% 23% 45% (48%)
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Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Three-Quarter Ahead 
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Four-Quarter Ahead 
Combination of Qualitative Forecasts: Gap Model
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: One-Quarter Ahead 
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Two-Quarter Ahead 















29Figure 5A: U.S. (1995.1–2008.12) 
 
Figure 5B: U.S. (1995.1–2008.12) 
 
30Figure 6A: U.S. (1995.1–2008.12) 
 
(1) Forecasts are made only when there is unanimity. 
Figure 6B: U.S. (1995.1–2008.12)
 
(1) Forecasts are made only when there is unanimity.   
Cores
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
14 3 %4 3 % 15% 33% (45%) 6% 28% 28% 11% 20% (53%)
24 3 % 43% 15% 33% (45%) 16% 28% 28% 11% 20% (53%)
34 3 %4 3 % 15% 33% (45%) 10% 28% 28% 11% 20% (53%)
44 3 %4 3 % 15% 33% (45%) 34% 28% 28% 11% 20% (53%)
43% 43% 15% 33% (45% ) 16% 28% 28% 11% 20% (53%)
Cores
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
12 6 %2 6 % 9% 15% (57%) 33% 43% 43% 22% 38% (57%)
22 6 %2 6 % 9% 15% (57%) 8% 43% 43% 22% 38% (57%)
32 6 %2 6 % 9% 15% (57%) 4% 43% 43% 22% 38% (57%)
4 26% 26% 9% 15% (57%) 50% 43% 43% 22% 38% (57%)
26% 26% 9% 15% (57%) 24% 43% 43% 22% 38% (57%)
Cores
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
33 6 %3 6 % 7% 13% (53%) 7% 21% 21% 7% 13% (57%)
63 6 %3 6 % 7% 13% (53%) 13% 21% 21% 7% 13% (57%)
93 6 %3 6 % 7% 13% (53%) 13% 21% 21% 7% 13% (57%)
12 36% 36% 7% 13% (53%) 33% 21% 21% 7% 13% (57%)
36% 36% 7% 13% (53%) 17% 21% 21% 7% 13% (57%)
Cores
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
34 5 %4 5 % 27% 43% (64%) 27% 36% 36% 18% 25% (67%)
64 5 %4 5 % 27% 43% (64%) 45% 36% 36% 18% 25% (67%)
9 45% 45% 27% 43% (64%) 64% 36% 36% 18% 25% (67%)
12 45% 45% 27% 43% (64%) 64% 36% 36% 18% 25% (67%)
45% 45% 27% 43% (64% ) 50% 36% 36% 18% 25% (67%)
MOVING AVERAGES (CPI) MOVING AVERAGES (PCE)
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: One-Quarter Ahead 










Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Two-Quarter Ahead 












Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
1 79% 79% 75% 82% (92%) 54% 72% 72% 62% 74% (81%)
2 63% 63% 56% 66% (85%) 49% 55% 55% 45% 57% (77%)
3 63% 63% 50% 75% (67%) 45% 62% 62% 40% 61% (65%)
43 8 % 38% 8% 22% (38%) 39% 64% 64% 28% 68% (40%)
60% 60% 47% 61% (70%) 47% 63% 63% 44% 65% (66%)
Cores
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
17 9 %7 9 % 71% 77% (92%) 68% 67% 67% 58% 70% (83%)
2 88% 88% 83% 91% (92%) 76% 67% 67% 50% 60% (83%)
3 67% 67% 42% 71% (58%) 52% 63% 63% 29% 50% (58%)
43 3 %3 3 % 8% 25% (33%) 48% 71% 71% 25% 60% (42%)
67% 67% 51% 66% (69%) 61% 67% 67% 41% 60% (67%)
Cores
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 73% 73% 73% 13% (100%) 56% 40% 40% 40% 40% (100%)
6 53% 53% 47% 31% (87%) 50% 47% 47% 47% 54% (87%)
97 3 %7 3 % 60% 33% (80%) 69% 67% 67% 53% 62% (87%)
12 73% 73% 27% 33% (40%) 56% 67% 67% 33% 71% (47%)
68% 68% 52% 28% (77% ) 58% 55% 55% 43% 57% (80%)
Cores
Lag Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Unam Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 50% 50% 50% 55% (92%) 42% 50% 50% 50% 60% (77%)
6 42% 42% 42% 50% (83%) 33% 50% 50% 42% 45% (85%)
9 42% 42% 42% 56% (75%) 42% 50% 50% 25% 43% (54%)
12 75% 75% 8% 50% (17%) 58% 67% 67% 25% 75% (31%)









Non-Overlapping Forecasts: One-Quarter Ahead 
Combination of Qualitative Forecasts: Gap Model
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Two-Quarter Ahead 
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Three-Quarter Ahead 










MOVING AVERAGES (CPI) MOVING AVERAGES (PCE)
31Figure 7: Canada (1995.1–2008.12) 
 
Figure 8: Canada (1995.1–2008.12) 
 
(1) Forecasts are made only when there is unanimity. 
 
Lag Lag
Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
1 2 0 % 2 0 %9 %1 7 % (49%) 1 79% 79% 72% 79% (90%)
2 2 0 % 2 0 %9 %1 7 % (49%) 2 74% 74% 64% 79% (79%)
3 20% 20% 9% 17% (49%) 3 57% 57% 43% 65% (65%)
4 20% 20% 9% 17% (49%) 4 51% 51% 21% 50% (42%)
20% 20% 9% 17% (49%) 65% 65% 50% 68% (69%)
Lag Lag
Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
11 4 % 1 4 % 0% 0% (43%) 19 1 % 9 1 % 78% 90% (83%)
21 4 % 1 4 % 0% 0% (43%) 2 96% 96% 83% 100% (79%)
31 4 % 1 4 % 0% 0% (43%) 3 70% 70% 57% 93% (58%)
41 4 % 1 4 % 0% 0% (43%) 4 22% 22% 13% 38% (33%)
14% 14% 0% 0% (43%) 70% 70% 58% 80% (64%)
Lag Lag
Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 21% 21% 14% 18% (79%) 3 73% 73% 67% 71% (93%)
6 21% 21% 14% 18% (79%) 6 60% 60% 60% 64% (93%)
9 21% 21% 14% 18% (79%) 9 47% 47% 33% 45% (73%)
12 21% 21% 14% 18% (79%) 12 73% 73% 27% 57% (47%)
21% 21% 14% 18% (79%) 63% 63% 47% 60% (77%)
Lag Lag
Major Signal 1 Signal 2 Major Signal 1 Signal 2
3 40% 40% 10% 20% (42%) 3 55% 55% 55% 55% (85%)
6 40% 40% 10% 20% (42%) 6 64% 64% 45% 56% (69%)
9 40% 40% 10% 20% (42%) 9 55% 55% 45% 71% (54%)
12 40% 40% 10% 20% (42%) 12 73% 73% 27% 100% (23%)
40% 40% 10% 20% (42%) 61% 61% 43% 70% (58%)
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: One-Quarter Ahead  Non-Overlapping Forecasts: One-Quarter Ahead 









Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Two-Quarter Ahead 
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Three-Quarter Ahead  Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Three-Quarter Ahead 
Non-Overlapping Forecasts: Two-Quarter Ahead 
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